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Scienti! c instruments
In 2011, Steven Shapin and Simon Scha! er wrote a new introduction to the 
reprint of their now classic Leviathan and the Air-Pump. # eir aim was to
map the situation in the $ eld of the historiography of science around 1985, 
when the book was $ rst published, and to outline the development of the 
$ eld in subsequent decades through a detailed analysis of the reception of 
their book. On the opening page, they indicate two technologies that were 
essential to their work: $ rst, obviously the air-pump and its role in the mak-
ing of knowledge in the seventeenth century, and second, the typewriter 
(and the related forms of science communication of the day) that they them-
selves used in their knowledge-making process. Although they suggest that 
the typewriter presented certain possibilities and limits that in% uenced the 
nature of knowledge as well as the forms of intellectual and social order that 
they did not acknowledge at the time, they do not pursue its analysis. # e 
typewriter $ gures in their introduction as an element that creates a historical 
distance (this is in the second half of the 1980s, when the typewriter began 
to give way to digital forms of text processing), marking an interval in time, 
and that situates their book as a historical and in a sense even a surpassed 
chapter in our body of knowledge: “it would be wonderful to inhabit an 
academic world in which there would be no call for a new edition of a work 
of empirical history produced by members of a previous generation”.1 # e
use of the estrangement e! ect of old technology to stress the historicity of 
a certain kind of knowledge does not necessarily make the logic, economy 
and politics of the development of knowledge identical to the logic, economy 
and politics of the development of technology. It does, however, point out the 
need to pay attention to the relationships and interdependencies between the 
material conditions of knowledge and the nature of the knowledge produced 
under those conditions.
Shapin and Scha! er managed to describe the emergence of a new style of 
reasoning through the ties between the material, literary and social technol-
ogies of the seventeenth century. Although some of their conclusions were 
rightfully disputed, their form of “ethnographic” case study has become 
1  Steven SHAPIN – Simon SCHAFFER, “Up for Air: Leviathan and the Air-Pump a Generation
On.” in: Steven SHAPIN – Simon SCHAFFER, Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Hobbes, Boyle, 
and the Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2011, p. xlx (xi–xlx).
# is article was supported by grant No. P401/11/2338 “Contemporary Approaches in 
Historical Epistemology” from the Czech Science Foundation.
531
Scientific Instruments and Epistemology Engines
very in! uential in the historiography of science focusing on experimental 
practices. " e “practical turn”, as this tendency of the 1980s is sometimes 
labelled, led to an emphasis on those aspects of science and knowledge 
that were previously ignored because they were considered epistemologi-
cally irrelevant, such as the instrumental equipment and materials used or 
developed in research, know-how and professional skills, local norms and 
standards, # nancial sources and the organisation of scienti# c institutions or 
research policies. Today we understand that the epistemological contribu-
tion of all these factors must be examined to fully understand the nature 
of contemporary and historical knowledge and its development. In both 
the traditional philosophy and history of science their role was severely 
underestimated.
" e second aphorism of Bacon’s Novum Organum states clearly what 
role instruments should play in the instauration of science:
Neither the naked hand nor the understanding le$  to itself can e% ect much. It is 
by instruments and helps that the work is done, which are as much wanted for 
the understanding as for the hand. And as the instruments of the hand either 
give motion or guide it, so the instruments of the mind supply either sugges-
tions for the understanding or cautions.2
It is signi# cant that within the philosophy and history of science it was 
mainly the # gurative meaning of this message that was celebrated: the sci-
enti# c method of induction is understood metaphorically as a material in-
strument and therefore our attention is drawn primarily to the new method 
of investigating nature (instruments of understanding) rather than to the 
instruments for carrying out that investigation (instruments of the hand) 
it is compared with. A typical function of a metaphor is to elucidate some 
novel or uncertain aspect of a thing by comparing it to something familiar 
and known that remains further unquestioned – with the transfer of mean-
ing our attention also shi$ s to the newly designated reality. Another factor 
contributing to the neglect of scienti# c instruments was the tradition of 
assigning mental and manual labour to two essentially di% erent categories, 
at least since Aristotle’s distinction between epistémé and techné, together
with the di% ering social status of their representatives. True knowledge is an 
a% air of the head, not the hand.
2 Sidney WARHAFT, Francis Bacon. A  Selection of His Works. Toronto: Macmillan 1965,
p. 331.
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We can ! nd a  lucid illustration of this tendency in Alexandre Koyré’s 
assessment of Galileo’s experiments. His contention is that Galileo never 
really went through with his experiments, they were simply illustrations of 
conclusions that he reached by logical reasoning:
Good physics is made a priori. # eory precedes fact. Experience is useless be-
cause before any experience we are already in possession of the knowledge we 
are seeking for. Fundamental laws of motion (and of rest), laws that determine 
the spatio-temporal behaviour of material bodies, are laws of a mathematical 
nature. Of the same nature as those which govern relations and laws of ! gures 
and numbers. We ! nd and discover them not in Nature, but in ourselves, in our 
mind, in our memory, as Plato long ago has taught us.3
Such idealist epistemology takes experiments only as rhetorical devices or 
at best as thought experiments. It is important to note, however, that here 
Koyré addresses Galileo’s work with inclined planes, but elsewhere names 
the telescope “the ! rst scienti! c instrument”, and his general verdict – “One 
could even say that not only astronomy, but science as such, began, with 
Galileo’s invention, a new phase of its development, the phase that we might 
call the instrumental one.”4 – is more cautious, although it has no serious 
in$ uence on his history of science, which remains a history of ideas.
It is naturally important to di% erentiate between various kinds of in-
struments, apparatus and materials – a ball on an inclined plane will have 
di% erent epistemological consequences than a  telescope or an air-pump. 
Most of the pioneering works on experimentation and instruments dealt 
with seventeenth-century material because that was a  time when, next to 
traditional measurement instruments, familiar since antiquity, a new kind 
of scienti! c equipment appeared. # is equipment not only measured length, 
weight or time, it also disturbed and distorted nature and produced unnatu-
ral and extreme conditions through which to discover nature’s secret truths. 
# eir prime motivation was the search for truth rather than practical neces-
sity, and they were most o& en used by scientists with more intellectual than 
practical interests. A  distinction between “mathematical” (measurement) 
and “philosophical” (experimental) instruments gradually developed. # is 
categorisation carries in itself the distinction between head and hand and 
3  Alexandre KOYRÉ, “Galileo and the Scienti! c Revolution of the Seventeenth Century.” " e 
Philosophical Review, vol. 52, 1943, no. 4, p. 347 (333–348).
4  Alexandre KOYRÉ, From the Closed World to the In# nite Universe. Baltimore: # e Johns
Hopkins Press 1957, p. 90.
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was motivated in part by the struggles for social recognition. However, it 
also opens up new aspects of technology. Philosophical instruments served 
the purposes of scienti! c investigation, but most of them were used for peda-
gogical purposes and public demonstration. " ey were the emblems of the 
work of natural philosophers, objects not only detecting but disclosing the 
workings of nature in performative and o# en spectacular ways. By forcing 
nature to reveal its mechanisms they also served the new breed of scientists 
as tools with which to demonstrate their powers of domination.
In the traditional philosophy of science, instruments were again only 
tangential. " e most signi! cant exception was the problem of the theory-
ladenness of observation prominent in the post-positivist philosophy of 
science since the late 1950s. Simply put, it claimed that our experience is 
always conditioned by some prior understanding and our perceptions are 
guided by prior beliefs and expectations. Since scienti! c experiments in-
volve observation, their meaning is possible only in relation to some prior 
theoretical background. Instruments don’t simply read data from nature 
since they were designed to answer the particular questions posed by a given 
theoretical context. If we look closely at the writings of the originators of the 
idea, we discover that there are signi! cant di% erences in what they under-
stand by the term and also that there are certain limits to the ladenness of 
experimental data. For Norwood Russell Hanson, theory-ladenness is, ! rst 
of all, causality-ladenness: there is a  sense-datum language that describes 
e% ects, events and experiences and there is an explanation that ! nds causal 
links between them:
Causal connexions are expressible only in languages that are many-levelled in 
explanatory power. " is is why causal language is diagnostic and prognostic 
[...]. " is is why within a context the cause-words are not “parallel” to the e% ect-
words, and why causes explain e% ects but not vice versa. For “cause”-words are 
charged: they carry a conceptual pattern with them. But “e% ect”-words, being, 
as it were, part of the charge, are less rich in theory and hence less able to serve 
in explanation of causes.5
" e main goal of science is explanation – diagnosis and prognosis – but 
Hanson’s view makes possible theory-free perceptual accounts, their status 
5 Norwood R. HANSON, Patterns of Discovery. An Inquiry Into the Conceptual Foundations of 
Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1958, p. 60.
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notwithstanding. Similarly, Pierre Duhem di! erentiates between a “concrete 
fact” and a “theoretical fact”, between a fact and its theoretical interpretation:
# e result of the operations in which an experimental physicist is engaged is 
by no means the perception of a group of concrete facts; it is the formulation 
of a judgment interrelating certain abstract and symbolic ideas which theories 
alone correlate with the facts really observed.6
Again, we are here faced with a  two-level model of scienti$ c experiment, 
which consists of the observation of phenomena and their theoretical inter-
pretation. # e interpretation is not merely a statement of causal relationships, 
as it was for Hanson, but has also to inscribe phenomena into an abstract 
and symbolic structure. # ese phenomena, however, can be observed inde-
pendently of theory, although their mere observation constitutes a prelimi-
nary, less advanced level of science. # ey have no meaning in themselves, 
they start making sense only a% er being incorporated into some theoretical 
framework. Popper sums up the theory-ladenness approach to experimenta-
tion in the following words: “# eory dominates the experimental work from 
its initial planning up to the $ nishing touches in the laboratory.”7 Scienti$ c 
instruments are here intended to test theoretical hypotheses, they have no 
autonomous epistemological e! ect. # e history of science is the history of 
scienti$ c theories.
It was by turning to actual scienti$ c practice that both philosophers and 
historians of science started to question the theory-ladenness view of experi-
mentation. Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening from 1983 sets out to 
do just that: show that the relationship between theory and experiment is far 
more complex than the hypothesis-testing theory suggests. While the $ rst 
section of the book on “representing” surveys contemporary discussions 
of the realism of physical theories, the second one on “intervening” o! ers 
a novel treatment of experimental practice and scienti$ c instruments.
History of the natural sciences is now almost always written as a history of 
theory. Philosophy of science has so much become philosophy of theory that the 
very existence of pre-theoretical observations or experiments has been denied. 
I  hope the following chapters might initiate a Back-to-Bacon movement, in 
6  Pierre M. M. DUHEM, ! e Aim and Structure of Physical ! eory. Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1991, p. 147.
7  Karl R. POPPER, ! e Logic of Scienti" c Discovery. London: Routledge 2002, p. 90.
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which we attend more seriously to experimental science. Experimentation has 
a life of its own.8
" e Baconian impulse resides in turning away from theory and repre-
sentation and towards interventions into the natural world, towards ma-
nipulations that produce new phenomena with which we can do something. 
Hacking presents a rich taxonomy of experiment-theory relationships that 
makes any e# ort to subsume them under some schematic model ultimately 
impossible. Although he has successfully challenged the traditional problem 
of theory con$ rmation, he has not disposed of it. " e next logical step was 
to turn from experiments to instruments, to the actual material culture of 
scienti$ c research.
Here another conceptual transfer was needed and this time the in-
spiration came from object-oriented anthropological, sociological and 
ethnological methodologies. " ese approaches to material culture and its 
history tend to stress the uses, circulations and transactions through which 
objects acquire meaning and value. " e identity of an object is not given by 
the purpose it was produced for but can develop and transform through its 
social life.
Even if our own approach to things is conditioned necessarily by the view that 
things have no meanings apart from those that human transactions, attribu-
tions, and motivations endow them with, the anthropological problem is that 
this formal truth does not illuminate the concrete, historical circulation of 
things. For that we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings 
are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through 
the analysis of these trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions 
and calculations that enliven things. " us, even though from a theoretical point
of view human actors encode things with signi$ cance, from a methodological
point of view it is the things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social 
context.9
" is “methodological fetishism” found its echo in the philosophy and histo-
riography of science of the late 1990s, where the primary focus was directed 
at the epistemological e# ects of scienti$ c things – instruments and materials.
8 Ian HACKING, Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of 
Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983, p. 149–150.
9 Arjun APPADURAI, “Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value.” In: Arjun 
APPADURAI (ed.),! e Social Life of ! ings: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1986, p. 5 (3–63).
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Let’s give an example of this shi!  of emphasis with another traditional 
problem, that of tacit knowledge. In Personal Knowledge and ! e Tacit 
Dimension, Michael Polanyi criticised the idea that knowledge has to be 
expressed in language. All knowledge, that is: apart from verbally commu-
nicated knowledge there are other kinds of knowledge that take on di" erent 
forms. “I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we 
can know more than we can tell.”10 Tacit knowledge is our implicit routines
and skills, our beliefs, ideals and mental models, which are di$  cult if not 
impossible to communicate. A classic example of such know-how is riding 
a bicycle: there is no known principle by which a cyclist keeps his balance, 
there are no formal rules that guide such practice and by which one would 
learn to ride a bicycle. It is a kind of practical knowledge that resides solely 
in a type of skilful performance.11 Whose knowledge is it exactly, where can 
we locate it? Whereas for Polanyi and from the theoretical point of view it is 
a kind of “human” knowledge, add some methodological fetishism and the 
perspective turns around:
We say someone knows how to ride a bicycle when he or she can consistently 
and successfully accomplish the task. A phenomenon such as that exhibited by 
Faraday’s motor shares these features of consistency and success with what usu-
ally is called know-how or skill knowledge. One might say that Faraday’s motor 
“knows how to make rotations,” but that overanthropomorphizes the motor. 
I prefer to say that the motor bears knowledge of a kind of material agency.12
Baird’s ! ing Knowledge is so far the most systematic account of a material-
ist epistemology of scienti% c instrumentation. It claims that not only theory 
but instruments as well convey knowledge and that this knowledge has to 
be understood as equal yet distinct and autonomous – only then we will be 
able to have a full account of science. Knowledge resides not only in minds 
but also in things. & ings have epistemic signi% cance independently of that 
expressed by theories; their epistemology must go beyond the traditional 
propositional and mentalist epistemologies. Furthermore, there cannot 
be a  single, universal material epistemology because there are essentially 
di" erent kinds of instruments (Baird distinguishes models that represent 
10  Michael POLANYI, ! e Tacit Dimension. Gloucester: Peter Smith 1983, p. 4.
11  Michael POLANYI, Personal Knowledge. Towards a  Post-Critical Philosophy. London:
Routledge 1958, pp. 51–52.
12 Davis BAIRD, ! ing Knowledge. A Philosophy of Scienti# c Instruments. Berkeley: University 
of California Press 2004, p. 15.
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phenomena, measuring instruments, and performative instruments that 
create phenomena). Instruments have what he calls cognitive autonomy – 
the development of instrumentation can proceed in partial and sometimes 
nearly complete independence of theory.
Epistemology engines
I have sketched an outline of the gradually changing attitude towards instru-
ments and materials in the philosophy and history of science – it proceeds 
from ignorance, neglect, marginalisation and the degradation of the roles 
and functions of instruments in scienti" c research to their revaluation, ap-
preciation, and even “fetishistic” celebration. No doubt this tendency has 
signi" cantly contributed to a better understanding of what science was and 
is and how it worked and works. However, there is one crucial aspect that 
is o# en missing from these accounts, since the problems of materiality are 
treated only in terms of the development of theoretical or historiographical 
discourse. We should also acknowledge that in between the material level 
of scienti" c research and its theoretical re$ ection there are various strata of 
mixed nature that mediate between these two ideal types.
Although there are quite a  few di% erent approaches that can address 
this gap and help to overcome it, I  will highlight two that I  " nd most 
stimulating: one from a historian and one from a philosopher of science and 
technology.
& e " rst approach, here exempli" ed by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, pro-
ceeds via criticism of the traditional model of scienti" c experiment. Recall 
Popper’s formulation, in which the development of knowledge is driven by 
theoretical hypotheses that are being tested by the experimental and instru-
mental side of research. & e " rst objection to this model states that there is 
never any singular, isolated experiment that the scientist designs in response 
to a theoretical question, but that one deals rather with a complex experi-
mental arrangement that creates knowledge that one does not yet possess. 
We should therefore rather speak about experimental systems that are not 
rigorously de" ned and o% er no clearly formulated questions. & ey are not 
tools for generating answers but rather materialise questions and generate 
material entities along with concepts and theories.
In such an experimental system we can discern two distinct yet in-
separable elements. & e " rst one is the research object – a material entity 
or a process, such as a physical structure, a chemical reaction or a biological 
function that constitutes the object of inquiry –, which Rheinberger calls an 
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“epistemic thing”. ! e second one is the “technical object”, the experimental 
conditions of research.
It is through them that the objects of investigation become entrenched and ar-
ticulate themselves in a wider # eld of epistemic practices and material cultures, 
including instruments, inscription devices, model organisms, and the $ oating 
theorems or boundary concepts attached to them. It is through these techni-
cal conditions that the institutional context passes down to the bench work 
in terms of local measuring facilities, supply of materials, laboratory animals, 
research traditions, and accumulated skills carried on by long-term technical 
personnel.13
Experimental conditions contain the epistemic thing – they embed it, al-
low it to manifest itself, yet at the same time constrain and restrict it. If 
the scienti# c object becomes stable enough, it can turn into the technical 
repertoire of the experimental arrangement. ! erefore, the di% erence be-
tween experimental conditions and epistemic things is merely functional; 
we cannot draw any de# nite or substantial divisions between these elements 
of the system. And it is precisely thanks to these shi& s, reconstructions, 
mutual exchanges and transformations that the experimental system can 
constantly innovate itself and generate new knowledge. Although the role of 
a certain entity depends on the place it occupies in an experimental context, 
although the roles can and do  change and we can even # nd hybrids that 
would be di'  cult to situate on either side, the distinction is maintained in 
scienti# c practice and, according to Rheinberger, “it helps to assess the game 
of innovation, to understand the occurrence of unprecedented events and 
with that, the essence of research.”14
! e second approach proceeds not through a minute analysis of the 
research process but rather through situating the production of knowledge 
within the practices and attitudes of the lifeworld. Here, the intellectualist 
history of science is modi# ed by the phenomenological insight that practical 
coping precedes theoretical re$ ection: theoretical thought should be placed 
on a  continuum with the practical lifeworld activity that exerts a  strong 
metaphorical in$ uence over how things – including matters of epistemol-
ogy – are conceived and interpreted. To assess the epistemological value of 
materiality, Don Ihde coins the term of an “epistemology engine”:
13 Hans-Jörg RHEINBERGER, Toward a History of Epistemic " ings. Synthesizing Proteins in 
the Test Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997, p. 29.
14 Ibid., p. 31.
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An “epistemology engine” is a technology or a set of technologies that through 
use frequently become explicit models for describing how knowledge is pro-
duced. " e most dramatic examples of “epistemology engines” in# uence our 
notions of subjectivity, directly a$ ecting how we understand what it means to 
be human and to perceive things from a human perspective. " ey enable us 
to draw connections between the knowledge producing capacity of the human 
mind and technologies that putatively function according to similar mechani-
cal processes. " e philosophy of mind is replete with theorists modeling the 
brain, which even today is poorly understood, on technologies whose design is 
better understood. An epistemology engine is thus a special case of a more gen-
eral phenomenological notion that entails the ways in which lifeworld practices 
form the basis for what o% en become scienti& c theories.15
Some instruments suggest or inspire our knowledge – such as the notorious 
example of the steam engine that motivated ideas of entropy and the second 
law of thermodynamics, although it developed without any systematic and 
explicit scienti& c theory. Some instruments do more than just suggest new 
phenomena and their conceptual understanding; they can serve as true 
models of how people perceive, think, acquire and generate knowledge. 
Camera obscura is the classic example of such an epistemology engine, since
next to its practical uses it also functioned as an epistemological & gure, as 
a metaphor of the eye and the mind.
A  few years before Ihde introduced his concept of the epistemology 
engine, a similar emphasis on the epistemological gain of camera obscura 
appeared in Jonathan Crary’s rereading of modern visual culture.16 In a Fou-
cauldian manner, Crary questions traditional accounts that assume a more 
or less linear development of visual technologies – the progress towards 
more complex and sophisticated means of achieving pictorial verisimilitude 
that starts with renaissance inventions of linear perspective and camera ob-
scura and continues through nineteenth-century photography, twentieth-
century & lm and television to contemporary technologies of virtual reality. 
What makes this generally accepted view of visual history problematic is 
15  Don IHDE – Evan SELINGER, “Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines.” Human Studies, 
vol. 27, 2004, no. 4, p. 362 (361–376). " e concept was introduced in Don IHDE, “Epistemology 
Engines.” Nature, vol. 406, 2000, no. 6791, p. 21.
16  See especially Jonathan CRARY, “Modernizing Vision.” In: Hal FOSTER (ed.), Vision and 
Visuality. Seattle: Bay Press 1988, pp. 29–44; Jonathan CRARY, “Techniques of the Observer.” 
October, vol. 45, 1988, pp. 3–35, and Jonathan CRARY, Techniques of the Observer. On Vision 
and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: " e MIT Press 1990.
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that it builds exclusively on privileged forms of images (art history) and that 
it presupposes an unchanging “natural” attitude of observers to them. By 
discussing the ways visual forms and technologies are embedded within the 
larger cultural contexts and forces that make up the ! eld in which percep-
tion occurs, Crary distinguishes between di" erent scopic regimes. During 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the camera obscura was “the most 
widely used model for explaining human vision, and for representing the 
relation of a perceiver and the position of a knowing subject to an external 
world.”17
$ is model was built on two interrelated assumptions. First, the inside 
is di" erentiated form the outside, a barrier separates the dark space of the 
human mind from the lucid surrounding world, which enters through the 
peephole and draws its image in the interior space. $ e second fundamental 
assumption is one of correspondence between inside and outside images; 
the model and its copy are in an accordance that is guaranteed by the 
mechanism of the camera obscura built on scienti! c principles. $ e camera 
obscura is thus
a ! gure for the observer who is nominally a free sovereign individual but who is 
also a privatized isolated subject enclosed in a quasi-domestic space separated 
from a public exterior world. [...] $ e visual world could be appropriated by an 
autonomous subject but only as a private unitary consciousness detached from 
any active relation with an exterior. $ e monadic viewpoint of the individual is 
legitimized by the camera obscura, but his or her sensory experience is subor-
dinated to an external and pre-given world of objective truth.18
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the camera was the dominant 
model for both rationalists and empiricists of how observation leads to 
truthful inferences about the world. According to Crary, this model col-
lapses in the early nineteenth century thanks to new experimental research 
in physiology, which tends to understand vision in more material, corpo-
real, and temporal terms. Within our understanding of the production of 
(scienti! c) knowledge, however, the model still retains some currency and 
should be replaced by di" erent engines that, ! rst of all, are not based on the 
concealment of their own materiality.
17  CRARY, Techniques of the Observer, p. 27.
18  CRARY, “Modernizing Vision.”, p. 33.
